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ABSTRACT 
We build a model of an IPO for firms with private information about their earnings profile over 
time and test the model’s predictions using a complete sample of newly listed Chinese 
companies between 1992 and 2007. The model predicts that IPO size is positively correlated 
with short-term operating performance that is not directly consistent with traditional theories. It 
also provides an explanation for negative correlation between debt and profitability that is not 
consistent with standard trade-off theory or signaling theory. The empirical results provide 
strong support for our model. 
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Asymmetric Information and IPO Size 
 
I. Introduction 
        A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) decision has been one of the top issues in corporate 
finance theory. Over the years financial economists have formulated and tested various theories 
of IPO, including models based on asymmetric information, market timing, and many others. 
Despite the tireless efforts, this issue has not been completely resolved.  
      The focus of our research is the link between firm’s IPO size and subsequent operating 
performance. Existing theories of equity issues based on asymmetric information usually predicts 
that equity issue is a negative signal about firm’s performance. Pecking-order theory (Myers and 
Majluff, 1984) for example predicts that firms prefer internal funds to finance investments and 
that equity will only be used as a last resort. Firms issuing equity will be undervalued. 
Consequently only firms with low expected performance may issue equity. Therefore one should 
expect a negative correlation between the size of equity issues including IPO and post-offer 
performance. Signalling theory usually suggests that debt issues can be used as a positive signal 
of firms performance (Leland and Pyle, 1977) as opposite to equity issues (negative signal).  
       The empirical literature usually focuses on the link between IPO decision and long-term 
operating performance after IPO although there is no research that focuses specifically on the 
link between IPO size and operating performance after issue. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, 
Partch, and Shah (1997), and Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating 
underperformance of equity issuing firms compared to non-issuing firms. This is indirectly 
consistent with negative correlation between IPO size and firm’s long-term performance. We 
have not found any research that focuses specifically on the link between IPO decision and short-
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term performance after issue. The evidence on short-term performance is mixed however. Some 
studies document the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing firms before and 
immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). According to Jain 
and Kini (1994) the operating return on assets is higher for IPO firms in the first years after the 
issue and the operating cash flow on assets is higher in year “0” (immediately after issue). In 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) profit margins are higher in years 0 and +1, although there is 
different evidence about operating returns. In Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) IPO firms have 
higher performance in year 0.  
        This study contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, we build a model of 
equity financing for firms with private information about their earnings profile over time. The 
model predicts that IPO size is positively correlated with short-term operating performance that 
is not directly consistent with traditional theories. It also provides an explanation for negative 
correlation between debt and profitability that is not consistent with standard trade-off theory or 
signaling theory. Second, we test the model’s predictions using a complete sample of newly 
listed Chinese companies between 1992 and 2007. The empirical results provide strong support 
for our model. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our model of IPO 
size. Section III offers empirical examination of our model. Section IV discusses our results and 
compares them with existing evidence in the literature. Section V summarizes and concludes. 
II. The Model 
2.1 Standard signalling model 
         We start with the standard signaling model. Consider a one-period environment where a 
firm considers equity financing for an investment project with cost  .  The firm has an amount   
4 
 
of internal funds (publicly observable) which can also be used to finance the project.
1
 A firm’s 
insiders have private information about the project future earnings. The firms are of two types, 
type   and type  , with respective earnings    and   . The risk-free interest rate is zero. There 
exists universal risk-neutrality and perfect competition among investors, which implies zero 
market profit and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued. The net-present value of 
investment for type   is     ,      . 
      Let    be a part of the project which is financed with equity (respectively      is the part 
of the project which is financed with internal funds; also the amount of dividends to existing 
shareholders equals          ) by the type  . Investors require a fraction of equity    such 
that: 
                                                                                                                                             (1) 
Now consider the payoff of shareholders of   in case   decides to mimic  . This equals    
  )  + −1−   . If a signaling equilibrium exists where   issues equity, the shareholders’ 
payoff for type    is         (the present value of  ). Thus, a separating equilibrium exists if  
                         . Using (1), this can be simplified to: 
                                                                                                                                        (2) 
Obviously, if      (and      by (1)) this can be simplified to      . In other words, a 
separating equilibrium can exists only if   has inferior quality compared to type  . If      
(and      by (1)), (2) holds automatically. In other words, if   uses internal funds to finance 
                                                          
1 Pre-IPO cash holdings and subsequent problem of pre-IPO dividend payments is relatively new in the literature. Its 
importance and its link to IPO decision is mentioned, for example, in Martin and Zeckhauser (2009). As anecdotal 
evidence note that in May 2006, Burger King conducted an Initial Public Offering (IPO). It sold primary shares to 
raise 400 million USD in new funds. However, shortly before going public, they paid out a dividend of 367 million 
USD to old shareholders in February 2006. Also note that introducing debt financing in the model will not change 
major results of our model as we discuss in the text. 
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the project, mimicking type   does not increase the payoff of  . Similar analysis applies when 
one considers equity financing by type  . A separating equilibrium condition is      . If we 
assume without loss of generality that      , then the only possible separating equilibrium is 
     and     . This leads to the following. 
        If     both firms can use internal funds to finance the project to avoid adverse selection 
problems. This will not generate any conclusions about the link between the size of equity issues 
and firms performance. Also a separating equilibrium may exist where type with superior 
performance uses internal funds and the one with inferior performance issues equity to finance 
the project or uses a mix of internal funds and equity to finance the project. Thus one should 
observe empirically a negative relationship between the size of equity issue and the firm’s 
performance after issue. If    , a separating equilibrium does not exist. However, if one 
assumes that firms can issue risk-free debt then a separating equilibrium can exist where better 
firm uses a mix of internal funds and debt and inferior firm uses a mix of internal funds, debt and 
equity. Again the prediction would be that the size of equity issue is negatively correlated to 
firm’s performance after issue. 
        So the prediction of standard signaling theory of capital structure is that the size of equity 
issue is a negative signal about firm’s future operating performance. For other examples see 
Leland and Pyle (1977) or Ross (1977). As we will discuss further however, empirically it is not 
clear whether this result holds. It is also not clear whether the performance in the standard model 
is short-term or long-term. It is not clear also why good quality firms pay large pre-IPO 
dividends (leading respectively to larger IPO) mentioned in Martin and Zeckhauser (2009). 
2.2 Our model 
         We build a model with asymmetric information that allows for focusing on a firm’s 
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performance profile over time and its effect on IPO size. Consider a firm that consider equity 
financing for a two-period investment project with cost    in period  ,      . A firm’s insiders 
have private information about expected earnings in each stage. The firms are of two types, type 
  and type  , with respective earnings     and     in stage  . The risk-free interest rate is zero. 
There exists universal risk-neutrality and perfect competition among investors, which implies 
zero market profit and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued. The net-present value of 
investment in stage   for type   is       ,      . 
          Suppose   issues equity for each stage of investments and distributes period   earnings as 
dividends. Let   be a part of the first stage of the project which is financed with equity 
(respectively     is the part of the project which is financed with internal funds) by the type  . 
In stage  , investors require a fraction of equity    such that: 
                                                                                                                                             (3) 
In stage   investors require a fraction of equity    such that: 
                                                                                                                             (4) 
Now consider the payoff of shareholders of   in case   decides to mimic  . This equals    
 1)  1+ −1−  1+(1− 1)(1− 2)  2. If a signaling equilibrium exists, the shareholders’ 
payoff for type    is                  (the present value of  ). Thus, a separating 
equilibrium exists if                                                 
    . If    , then using (3) and (4), this can be simplified to: 
                                                      
              
              
 
          
          
  
   
 
                                               (5) 
If    , this can be simplified to 
                                                                                                                                               (6) 
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It means that if type   does not issue equity in period 1 and issues equity in period 2 then in 
order for separating equilibrium to exist type   should have inferior performance in period 2.  
A similar condition can be developed for type  . 
Poposition 1. Suppose         . A separating equilibrium where type   issues a larger 
amount of equity than type   dominates a separating equilibrium where     issues a larger 
amount of equity, i.e. the first one should be observed more frequently.  
        Proof. See Appendix. 
    Proposition 1 implies a positive correlation between the size of IPO and firm’s short-term 
performance after issue  
      To illustrate the proof of Proposition 1 consider the case                 (i.e. 
suppose firms have the same total earnings over two periods and differ only in earnings profile 
over time). One can see that (5) becomes        . It means a separating equilibrium exists 
where type   issues equity and type   does not issue equity (     for type   otherwise 
condition (5) will not hold for type  ).  
What explains this result? Intuitively, the value of shares in period   depends on the 
firm's total value and not on the firm’s performance in a particular period, while the value of 
shares in period   depends on period  ’s performance. The firm with high second-period 
earnings can have a loss from period   undervaluation.  
III. Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Data and summary statistics 
The complete sample of Chinese domestic A-share IPOs completed from the start of 
1992 to the end of 2007 is obtained from the GTA’s IPO database. GTA is the first and largest 
research data vendor in China. The data provided is considered high quality and contains both 
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stock market and macro-economic information for academic research on China. The database 
provides not only information about the IPO such as the offer price, offer size and first-day 
return, but also balance sheet and operating performance data three years prior to and three years 
after the IPO. 
The final sample contains a total of 1,571 newly listed Chinese firms. Table 1 displays 
the number of IPOs by year as well as some summary statistics. The mean offer price of all IPOs 
is yuan 8.0 (roughly one US dollar). The first-day return, calculated as the percentage difference 
between the first-day close price and the offer price, averages 227.4%, making Chinese IPOs 
among the most underpriced around the world.  
The average amount of gross proceeds raised from the IPO is yuan 750.9 million. The 
number of employees at the time of the IPO is on average slightly over 2,000. It is well known 
that many of the IPO firms are state-owned enterprises being privatized. The mean percentage of 
equity owned by the state is 55.1% before the IPO and 39.5% afterwards. 
3.2 Operating performance of IPO firms 
Three metrics are used to measure the operating performance of an IPO firm, based on 
the firm’s reported accounting data: 1) sales; 2) net profit; and 3) earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). The results are reported in Table 2. Panel A of the table presents the means and 
medians of the three performance measures from three years prior to and three years after the 
IPO. Panel B reports the year over year percentage change in each of the operating performance 
gauges from year -3 to year +3, where year 0 is the IPO year. In calculating the percentage 
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changes, we exclude those firms that have negative or zero starting values, since their results are 
meaningless.  
The median figures indicate that sales, net profit and EBIT all grow at about 20% each 
year in the three years leading up to the IPO. Sales continue to grow steadily at about 15% each 
year in the three years following the IPO. Net profit and EBIT, on the other hand, seem to have 
peaked at the time of the IPO, and stagnate in the post-IPO years. EBIT, for instance, increases at 
an annual rate of around 20% in the three years leading up to the IPO, but its growth rate drops 
to 10.7%, 1.1%, and 3.0%, respectively, in the subsequent three years. The results for the net 
profit are similar. 
3.3 Correlation coefficients 
 Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of offer size with a plethora of variables. It 
can be seen that offer size is positively correlated with total assets and sales, both of which are 
proxies of firm size.  
Offer size is also positively correlated with state ownership either before or after the IPO. 
This positive correlation can be interpreted in two ways. First, state ownership may proxy for 
firm size, as state-owned enterprises (SEOs) are typically large. Second, SEOs may be allowed 
by the stage regulator to have larger offers. Additionally, the correlation between offer size and 
EBIT growth from year 1 to year 2 after the IPO is positive and significant at the 5% level.  
 Relative offer size, which is offer size scaled by total assets, is also positively correlated 
with EBIT growth from year 1 to year 2. However, relative offer size is negatively correlated 
with state ownership prior to the IPO. 
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3.4 Cross-sectional regressions and results 
The key prediction of our model of new issues under asymmetric information is that 
firms will sell more new shares when they expect higher short-term earnings or lower long-term 
earnings. To test this prediction, we run the following regression: 
Relative Offer Size = α + β1*State ownership +β2*ln(Sales) + β3*Performance +  ε    
The dependent variable is the relative offer size, which is offer size (gross proceeds from the IPO) 
scaled by total assets in the IPO year. State ownership is the percentage owned by the state 
government prior to the IPO. Since the Chinese state regulator may favor state-owned enterprises 
(SEOs) when choosing which firm can go public, it is expected that SEOs have larger relative 
offer in their IPOs. Sales is the annual sales in the IPO year, measured in yuan millions and in 
logarithm. Sales is included to control for firm size. 
We use EBIT growth in the three years after the IPO for short-term operating 
performance. Specifically, operating performance is measured by the year-over-year percentage 
changes in EBIT up to three years after the IPO, as below: 
EBIT_0Y1 = percentage change from year 0 to year 1 
EBIT_1Y2 = percentage change from year 1 to year 2 
EBIT_2Y3 = percentage change from year 2 to year 3 
EBIT_0Y2 = cumulative percentage change from year 0 to year 2 
EBIT_0Y3 = cumulative percentage change from year 0 to year 3 
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The OLS regression results are reported in Table 4. The results show that relative offer 
size is negatively associated with sales, a proxy for firm size. This result implies that large firms 
have relatively lower offer size. State ownership prior to the IPO only marginally affects relative 
offer size, and the effect, if any, is negative. This negative association between state ownership 
and relative offer size is at odds with the notion that state-owned enterprises are favored to sell 
more shares in their IPO debuts. The result, however, may reflect the intention of the state 
government to maintain adequate control over the newly listed firm.   
Turning to the operating performance variables, the focus of our investigation, in the first 
three regressions we add the year-over-year growth in EBIT in the three years after the IPO 
separately. The coefficients of EBIT_0Y1 and EBIT_1Y2 are positive and significant 
statistically. The results suggest that IPO firms sell more shares relative to their assets when the 
EBIT growth is higher in each of the two years after the IPO.  The change in EBIT from year 2 
to 3 (i.e., EBIT_2Y3), on the other hand, does not have any significant impact on relative offer 
size. In regression 4, we include all three year-over-year changes in EBIT. The results are similar.  
In the next regression, we use the cumulative change in EBIT in the first two years post 
offer. The coefficient on this new variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. In the last 
regression, the cumulative EBIT growth in the first three years is added as independent variable. 
Its coefficient is, again, positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the prediction of our model. 
IV. Discussions  
Our model predicts that the size of the IPO is positively correlated with firms expected 
12 
 
earnings after issue. Our empirical findings confirm this result.  
        Among basic rational market intuitions, the following theories are notable. The theory of 
agency cost of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) underlines the idea that larger equity issues 
decrease the manager's stake in the company and reduce the incentive to undertake value 
maximizing projects. This results in post-offer underperformance of the firm, though the theory 
does not compare the performance in the short run with that in the long run after the issue. Also 
note that the link between post-offer underperformance and a low managerial fraction of equity 
is empirically controversial. For instance, Pagano et al. (1995), Cai and Loughran (1998) and 
Mickelson et al. (1997) do not confirm the positive correlation between the fraction of insiders' 
equity and firm performance. 
           The trade-off theory in its standard form, proposing that firms equalize the marginal tax 
benefits associated with additional debt to the marginal cost of bankruptcy, suggests that more 
profitable firms should issue more debt (or less equity). However, it will not predict the link 
between the size of equity issues and dynamic profile of performance after the issue (long-term 
performance versus short-term performance). For instance, it will predict that type a (high 
expected performance in the first period) should issue less equity or more internal funds and 
more debt if available than type b in the first period in contrast to our results. According to the 
free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) debt is an instrument for solving the problem of a manager's 
entrenchment and thus more debt should lead to higher overall performance. However, this 
theory does not give an explanation for why firms should issue equity. This theory would also 
suggest that type a (with high expected performance in the first period) should use internal funds 
or issue more debt in order to prevent managers from overspending. Recently several dynamic 
versions of the trade-off model were developed which combine taxes, bankruptcy costs and 
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different kinds of agency costs. Typically, these models lead to less extreme and more realistic 
predictions than the basic ideas do. However, we have not found a model which systematically 
analyzes the link between IPO size and dynamic profile of operating performance after the issue. 
We will provide more discussion of dynamic trade-off models later when we discuss the 
correlation between debt and profitability. 
             The market timing argument (see, for instance, Baker and Wurgler, 2002) points out that 
while in Modigliani and Miller environment the capital structure decisions (and consequently an 
IPO size decision) are not affected by the magnitude of share prices or by the “hotness” of the 
market, in reality one observes that firms tend to issue equity when the market prices are 
relatively high and do not issue equity when the prices are relatively low.  To relate this 
observation to the evidence about operating performances, one line of the literature focuses on 
non-rational aspects of investors behavior. For instance, some research argues that investors tend 
to be overoptimistic during new issues or that the analysts’ forecasts are inadequately high.2 The 
firms thus sell shares when they are overvalued or the firm is expected to perform poorly 
compared to the price of the issue. Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) argue that managers 
manipulate earnings (sacrifice future earnings by pushing up current earnings) prior to going 
public in order to attract more non-informed investors. We share with this paper the idea that 
managers may be involved in earnings management leading to their private information about 
the timing of cash flows. However our framework assumes completely rational investors which 
infer information about a firm’s earnings profile from observing its financing decision.3 The 
difference between these two approaches (rational market versus non-rational) is not only 
                                                          
2
For references see Ritter and Welch (2002) or Loughran and Ritter (1997). 
3Stein’s (1989) model explains earnings inflation in a rational world but it does not explicitly analyzes an IPO size 
problem. 
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theoretical. Some recent empirical research argues in favor of efficient market version of the 
market timing argument (Schultz (2003) and Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005)) -“pseudo-
market timing”- where shares are not overpriced.  
      When investors are rational the prices are supposed to correctly reflect firms’ current and 
future earnings and not only current earnings. In such an environment and assuming that there is 
no asymmetric information or agency costs, how can one explain that first, firms time their 
issues and second, why the firms issue shares when operating performance is high and why it 
becomes low in the long run after issue? The literature based on rational investors is able to 
argue why firms may be interested in issuing equity in periods when market prices are high 
although it is not focused on explaining the link between IPO size and changes in operating 
performance after issue.
4
        
       Both the agency and trade-off theory also provide insight into market timing. According to 
the debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977) an excessive senior debt may lead the firm to forego 
some valuable investment opportunities. Thus, a firm with high market value of shares and good 
investment opportunities respectively will lose more from underinvestment and will thus issue 
equity instead. However it is not straightforward to predict a link between the size of equity 
issues and subsequent operating performance consistent with observable evidence without 
making additional assumptions about, for instance, the link between share price and current 
                                                          
4
In Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) firms can time their projects and the financial market is imperfect (there are 
switching rents imposed by intermediaries). Low-profit projects tend to be financed with equity. Firms will develop 
only the projects with sufficiently high quality. In recession, only highly profitable projects will be undertaken and 
low-profit projects will be shelved until an expansion occurs. This paper offers an explanation for why more equity 
is issued during expansions. Lucas and  McDonald  (1990) explains why equity issues on average are preceded by 
abnormally positive stock returns and why equity issues are positively correlated with stock market performance. 
See also “money left on the table” idea in, for example, Ranjan (2004).  
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operating performance.
5
 An advantage of the present paper compared to Myers (1977) (and some 
other theories mentioned in this section) is that it is not based on the link between profitability 
and investment opportunities (for instance Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
do not find that post-offer underperformance is due to the lower or higher amounts of 
investment). In our model, all firms invest the same amount of funds and the difference comes 
only from future operating performance profiles. Finally note that Baker and Wrugler (2002) do 
not find a lot of support for underinvestment theory of market timing.  
       Our model predicts that leverage is negatively correlated with profitability.
6
 As was 
mentioned above, IPO size is negatively related to debt/equity ratio so firms with higher leverage 
(and smaller IPO size) should be more profitable. Note that the trade-off theory in its standard 
form is inconsistent with the negative correlation between debt and profitability because highly-
profitable firms should tend to finance with debt in order to reduce their taxes. Hennessy and 
Whited (2005) develop a dynamic trade-off theory with the idea that a profitable firm does not 
have to distribute its earnings immediately as the standard models assume. This may reduce the 
incentive to reduce taxes by issuing debt. The financing decision depends on the next period 
financing margin or what the firm is going to do in the future: to issue more equity, to distribute 
more earnings or to remain neutral. While providing a valid intuition about why the static trade-
off may not work, the authors do not obtain a theoretical proposition about the link between debt 
and profitability. However, they do show numerically that under some plausible values of 
parameters one can observe the negative correlation between debt and profitability in their model. 
                                                          
5
If one assumes that high current performance corresponds to the high share price then it can explain point (ii). It 
will still be difficult to explain why a firm issuing more equity should underperform in the long run after issuing 
equity and undertaking all its investment opportunities.  
6
See, for instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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      Zwiebel (1996) develops a dynamic model of capital structure based on the managers’ 
entrenchment argument. The paper suggests that when a firm has more valuable investment 
opportunities the need to issue new debt as a disciplinary device decreases which leads to the 
situation where firms with lower debt (and larger equity) are likely to be more profitable. While 
providing an idea about the negative correlation between debt and profitability the paper does not 
explain why firms issuing equity underperform in the long run. Also equity financing is not 
explicitly analyzed in the model.  
      Signalling theory suggests that firms can signal their quality by changing their capital 
structure. A common prediction of signaling models is that debt serves a signal of positive 
information about future earnings (Ross, (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977)). Evidence on the 
positive market reaction on debt issues does not support signaling theories. Eckbo (1986) as well 
as Antweiler and Frank (2006) find insignificant changes in stock prices in response to straight 
corporate debt issues. 
  
       According to signaling theory, high-quality firms should issue debt and low-quality firms 
should issue equity. The empirical prediction is that firm value (or profitability) and the debt-to-
equity ratio is positively related. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. Most empirical studies 
report a negative relationship between leverage and profitability as discussed earlier. In a similar 
spirit, some studies document the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing firms before 
and immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Several studies 
examine long-term firm performance following capital structure changes. Shah (1994) reports 
that business risk falls after leverage-increasing exchange offers but rises after leverage-
decreasing exchange offers. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and 
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Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating underperformance of equity issuing 
firms compared to non-issuing firms. 
 
 Hennessy, Livdan, and Miranda (2010) develop a dynamic model of the firm under 
repeated hidden information. In equilibrium, firms signal positive information by substituting 
debt for equity, which explains the inverse relationship between leverage and net worth. Firms 
with negative private information are unlevered, which is consistent with debt conservatism.  
  
 Investors such as banks can sometimes obtain information on a firm’s quality and 
produce analytical information. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) show that good firms want to 
partition their securities so that some claims are informationally sensitive. If the cost of 
becoming informed is low and the degree of asymmetric information is high, firms may prefer a 
higher information sensitive security to promote information production by “specialized” outside 
investors. This explains the negative correlation between debt and firm value because firms with 
low profitability do not need to issue equity, which is sensitive to a firm’s value. Fulghieri and 
Lukin also predict that younger firms with good growth opportunities are more likely to be 
equity financed. These firms can be especially interested in information production by outside 
investors.  
V. Summary and Conclusions 
A firm’s IPO decision has been one of the top issues in corporate finance. Over the years 
financial economists have formulated and tested various theories of IPO, including models based 
on asymmetric information, market timing, and many others. Despite the tireless efforts, this 
issue has not been completely resolved.  
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The focus of our research is the link between IPO size and subsequent operating 
performance. Existing theories of equity issues based on asymmetric information usually predicts 
that equity issue is a negative signal about firm’s performance. We establish a theoretical model 
of IPO size under asymmetric information. The model focuses on a firm’s performance profile 
over time and its effect on IPO size. The model predicts that IPO firms will sell more shares 
when insiders expect stronger short-term future earnings growth.  
We offer an empirical examination of the model’s predictions using a sample of newly 
listed Chinese firms. The results provide strong support for our model. Specifically, the relative 
offer size of an IPO is positively correlated with the firm’s earnings growth in the three years 
after the issue.  
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Table 1 
Sample and Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the sample and summary statistics of newly listed Chinese firms. Offer price is the 
price of the IPO shares. First-day return is the percentage difference between the first-day close price and 
the offer price. Offer size is the gross proceeds (in yuan millions) from the IPO. State ownership is the 
equity owned by the state government.  
 
Year N Offer 
Price 
(yuan) 
First-day 
return 
Offer size 
(in yuan 
millions) 
Number of 
employees 
State 
ownership 
before IPO 
State 
ownership 
after IPO 
1992 40 25.9 487.0% 608.6 3,672 21.7% 36.6% 
1993 129 13.1 380.7% 274.5 3,005 46.5% 42.2% 
1994 106 5.2 158.8% 156.7 2,997 54.5% 38.8% 
1995 28 3.9 542.7% 200.4 3,933 49.2% 35.9% 
1996 206 5.2 333.3% 130.9 2,248 49.4% 36.7% 
1997 209 6.1 265.8% 323.3 2,652 65.2% 45.5% 
1998 104 6.2 292.9% 383.8 3,432 76.0% 54.0% 
1999 97 6.3 116.2% 522.1 2,969 70.2% 48.6% 
2000 133 8.0 154.7% 611.7 1,883 70.6% 47.8% 
2001 75 9.0 229.9% 764.7 9,340 68.0% 47.3% 
2002 71 7.0 148.7% 761.7 2,797 67.4% 45.0% 
2003 67 7.3 72.0% 705.1 2,002 58.6% 38.8% 
2004 100 8.5 70.1% 361.1 1,705 39.9% 26.1% 
2005 15 6.6 45.1% 384.2 2,761 41.2% 25.1% 
2006 65 8.2 84.8% 1970.5 13,242 37.3% 26.2% 
2007 126 11.5 193.1% 3878.7 14,236 27.0% 21.3% 
Overall 1,571 8.0 227.4% 750.9 4,276 55.1% 39.9% 
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Table 2 
Operating Performance of Newly Listed Chinese Firms 
 
Sales, Net Profit and EBIT are measured in yuan millions. In calculating the year-over-year 
percentage changes, observations with negative or zero starting values are excluded. Year 0 is 
the IPO year. 
 
Panel A: Operating Performance from Year -3 to Year +3 
 
  Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 
Sales N 1443 1490 1266 1542 1430 1368 1359 
Mean 1348.1 1633.3 1990.1 2609.5 1617.8 1443.8 1778.1 
Median 211.0 261.0 316.0 366.5 411.0 461.0 528.0 
Net Profit N 1428 1475 1253 1391 1391 1367 1359 
Mean 221.5 268.4 326.8 446.7 217.5 106.8 132.3 
Median 22.0 29.0 35.0 46.0 48.0 44.0 44.0 
EBIT N 1443 1487 1264 1542 1430 1368 1359 
Mean 299.0 393.3 458.4 570.2 319.8 150.0 170.5 
Median 29.0 36.0 44.0 56.0 60.0 54.0 53.0 
 
Panel B: Year over Year Percentage Changes from Year-3 to Year +3 
 
  (-3, -2) (-2, -1) (-1,0) (0, +1) (+1, +2) (+2, +3) 
Sales N 1,441 1,238 1,246 1,416 1,362 1,354 
Mean 67.8% 37.6% 27.3% 28.2% 22.3% 23.6% 
Median 22.5% 18.7% 15.4% 16.1% 14.2% 14.4% 
Net Profit N 1,426 1,226 1,145 1,262 1,277 1,259 
Mean 93.4% 50.7% 35.0% -5.1% -42.7% 96.6% 
Median 24.3% 18.8% 24.0% 9.6% 1.8% 3.1% 
EBIT N 1,439 1,234 1,246 1,412 1,316 1,262 
Mean 97.8% 46.4% 56.5% 60.8% -17.8% 51.0% 
Median 23.9% 18.0% 20.2% 10.7% 1.1% 3.0% 
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Table 3 
Correlation Coefficients 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficient matrix. Offer size is the gross proceeds from the 
IPO, in yuan millions. Rel_Size is the relative offer size, defined as offer size divided by total 
assets in the IPO year. Sales is the annual sales (in yuan millions) in the IPO year. TA is total 
assets (in yuan millions) in the IPO year. State_Own0 and State_Own1 are, respectively, the 
state ownership before and after the IPO. EBIT_0Y1, EBIT_1Y2, and EBIT_2Y3 are, 
respectively, the change in EBIT from year 0 to 1, from year 1 to 2, and from year 2 to 3. 
 
 Offer size Rel_Size TA Sales State_Own0 State_Own1 EBIT_0Y1 EBIT_1Y2 EBIT_2Y3 
Offer Size 1.00 
   
     
Rel_Size 0.274
* 
1.00        
TA 0.714
* 
-0.040 1.00       
Sales 0.501
* 
-0.029 0.643
* 
1.00      
State_Own0 0.088
* 
-0.067
* 
0.043 0.040 1.00     
State_Own1 0.177
* 
0.000 0.069
* 
0.073
* 
0.898
* 
1.00    
EBIT_0Y1 -0.001 0.051 -0.018 -0.007 -0.107
*
 0.005 1.00   
EBIT_1Y2 0.086
* 
0.168
* 
0.064
* 
0.011 -0.058
* 
0.021 -0.111 1.00  
EBIT_2Y3 -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.035 -0.041 -0.019 -0.022 1.00 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results of Offer Size/Total Asset 
 
The dependent variable is the offer size/TA ratio, where offer size is the gross proceeds from the 
IPO, and TA is the yearend total assets in the IPO year. State ownership is the percentage equity 
owned by the state prior to the IPO. Sales is the annual sales, in yuan millions, in the IPO year. 
EBIT_0Y1, EBIT_1Y2, and EBIT_2Y3 are, respectively, the percentage change in EBIT from 
year 0 to 1, from year 1 to 2, and from year 2 to 3. EBIT_0Y2 is the cumulative percentage 
change in EBIT from year 0 to 2, while EBIT_0Y3 is the cumulative percentage change in EBIT 
from year 0 to 3. For the year-over-year percentage changes, observations with negative or zero 
starting values are excluded.  *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, 
and 
*
 indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.693 
[8.54]
*** 
 
0.719 
[7.91]
*** 
0.719 
[7.58]
*** 
0.684 
[7.14]
*** 
0.554 
[6.94]
*** 
0.682 
[7.71]
*** 
State ownership -0.059 
l-1.48] 
 
-0.070 
[-1.62] 
-0.078 
[-1.72]
* 
-0.049 
[-1.07] 
-0.031 
[-0.81] 
-0.072 
[-1.69]
* 
Ln(Sales) -0.052 
[-3.85]
*** 
 
-0.053 
[3.45]
*** 
-0.052 
[-3.24]
*** 
-0.053 
[-3.27]
*** 
-0.034 
[-2.53]
** 
-0.048 
[-3.25]
*** 
EBIT_0Y1 0.008 
[1.82]
* 
 
 
 
0.011 
[2.29]
** 
  
EBIT_1Y2 
 
0.017 
[3.31]
*** 
 
 
0.073 
[6.00]
*** 
  
EBIT_2Y3 
  
0.000 
[-0.45] 
 
0.000 
[-0.25] 
  
EBIT_0Y2 
   
 0.087 
[17.15]
*** 
 
 
EBIT_0Y3 
   
  0.029 
[4.28]
***
 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.02 
F-value 7.83 9.47 5.50 10.92 105.04 11.71 
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Appendix 
 First consider        . In this case a separating equilibrium does not exist because    mimicks 
 . To see this note the following. Let   be the difference between the left and right side of 
Equation (5). If   is large enough, a separating equilibrium where   issues equity does not exist.  
Proposition 2. 
  
  
   if                 and 
  
  
   if                  
Intuitively, it means that if   has higher overall value than   then issuing more equity by   
makes separating equilibrium harder to achieve and vice versa. So if we can show that a 
separating equilibrium does not exist even when     it will be no separating equilibrium when  
    . When      Equation (5) becomes        . So the separating equilibrium does not 
exist. There are no predictions regarding the size of IPO and firm performance. 
      Second consider        . In order to analyze this case, let us denote the total expected 
cash flow for type   over both periods           . Also let    denote the rate of earnings 
growth (       ). The expected earnings in each stage are then:  
                                                            
  
    
  and     
    
    
                                                               (7) 
Equation (5) can be rewritten as  
                                                    
         
         
 
     
  
    
 
    
    
   
        
    
 
                                                  
Or                                               
                             
   
     
  
  
    
 
    
    
   
        
    
                                           (8) 
 
Proposition 3. 
  
   
  . 
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Proof. Using (1), (2) and (5) we have:      
  
     
  
  
    
 
    
    
   
        
    
   
Next using the following identity: 
                                 
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
    
    
   
 
   
    
    
   
  
  
   
   
    
    
   
 
we get: 
  
   
        . 
   
    
        . 
   
    
  . 
    
   
         and finally 
  
   
  . 
     On the intuitive level Proposition 2 is straightforward: under asymmetric information a firm’s 
expected surplus increases if the market value of the firm (the value of the firm from the 
investor’s viewpoint) increases. A more intriguing question is how do changes in a firm’s 
earnings growth rate affect  . This question is at the core of the analysis below.   
      From (7) an increase in the rate of earnings growth increases the firm’s expected 
performance in the second period. We know that the price of equity depends on the value of the 
firm, and not just first-period performance. The value of any claim issued by the firm in the 
second period depends heavily on the firm’s second-period expected performance. Hence an 
increase in the market’s perception of the firm’s rate of earnings growth increases the expected 
payoff of the firm issuing equity.  
Proposition 4. 
  
   
  .  
Using (1), (2), (5) and the following identity: 
                                 
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
    
    
   
 
   
    
    
   
  
  
   
   
    
    
   
 
we get: 
  
   
 
             
             
  . End proof.  
Let us return to the case         . Two cases are possible. If                 a 
separating equilibrium where   issues equity does not exist while a separating equilibrium where 
  issues equity can exist. So the prediction will be that there is positive relationship between the 
size of IPO and firm’s performance after issue. To see this consider the case with the same type 
  and a type    such that        and         As was shown above a separating equilibrium 
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where    issues equity does not exist. Also by proposition 2 a separating equilibrium does not 
exist where   issues equity. 
    Now consider                 . In this case contrary to any case considered above a 
separating equilibrium can exist where type    issues a larger amount of equity than type  . We 
will show however that if a separating equilibrium exists where   issues more equity than   then 
there also exists the following separating equilibrium with types      and      with the 
following expected earnings:                                   ;            where 
     issues the same amount of equity as type   in initial equilibrium and type      issues no 
equity. This follows from the above analysis for firms with the same value and also propositions 
2 and 3 because        and       .      does not mimick      because in initial 
equilibrium type   does not mimick type   and           and           and          .  
The opposite however is not true. A summary of our findings is shown in the following table. 
Case Equilibrium Empirical prediction 
           
     
No separating equilibria No correlation between IPO size and 
performance after issue 
           
            
         
In a separating equilibria type   
issues more equity than type   
Positive correlation between IPO size 
and firm’s performance after issue 
           
            
         
Separating equilibria where type   
issues more equity than type   
prevails over separating equilibria 
where type   issues more equity 
Positive correlation between IPO size 
and firm’s performance after issue 
 
 
